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CAITLIN LINDENHOVIUS

Sexual Exploitation of Children: Protection From
More Than the Public
ABSTRACT
Each year, countless children fall prey to sexual predators who use, coerce,
or manipulate them to produce child pornography. Child pornography can
only be produced through the sexual exploitation of children. In the late
1970s, Congress began providing statutory protection against the sexual
exploitation of minor children by prohibiting the production, distribution,
and possession of child pornography.
This Note will generally discuss federal statute 18 U.S.C. § 2251, which
prohibits the sexual exploitation of children, but specifically focus on
18 U.S.C. § 2251(d). Subsection (d) prohibits knowingly making any notice
or advertisement offering to receive a visual depiction of a child or children
engaged in sexually explicit activity. When interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2251, the
federal courts have focused on whether an individual’s overt act constituted
a notice or advertisement to receive child pornography. However, recent
federal court cases have led to varying results in child pornography
production cases without any changes to the apparent ambiguity of
applicable statutes.
The ambiguity surrounding the meaning of notice or advertisement as
written in 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) has been addressed by federal courts but rarely
in the context of private, person-to-person communication. One of the first
federal cases to do so was United States v. Caniff. The Eleventh Circuit, sua
sponte, reexamined private, person-to-person communication as it related to
18 U.S.C. § 2251 (d) and, in doing so, undercut the statute’s legislative intent
in a way that no other circuit court had done previously.
The ambiguity surrounding the meaning of notice or advertisement
hinders the statute’s effectiveness in eliminating the child pornography
industry. To adequately protect children from sexual exploitation, 18
U.S.C. § 2251(d) must be interpreted broadly to include private, person-toperson text messages. If a broad interpretation is not adopted by the courts,
Congress must either amend 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) to clearly define the
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meaning of both “notice” and “advertisement” or rewrite 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)
using clearer language to signal its intention to protect children from offers
to participate in child pornography.
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NOTE
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN: PROTECTION FROM
MORE THAN THE PUBLIC
Caitlin Lindenhovius†
I. INTRODUCTION
Millions of children fall prey to sexual predators each year.1 In 2020, the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children CyberTipline received
over 21.7 million reports of suspected child sexual exploitation.2 The victims
of childhood sexual exploitation live with a permanent record of their sexual
abuse circulating on the internet forever,3 frequently in the form of child
pornography.4 Many children who are victims of sexual exploitation are not
†

Senior Staff, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 16; J.D. Candidate, Liberty
University School of Law (2022); Master of Science, Criminal Justice, Southern New
Hampshire University (2018); Bachelor of Science, Business Administration, SUNY
University at Buffalo (2015); Bachelor of Arts, Political Science, SUNY University at Buffalo
(2015).
1
See Brenna O’Donnell, Cyber Tipline 2020: Rise in Online Enticement and Other Trends
from Exploitation Stats, NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILD. BLOG (Feb. 24, 2021),
https://www.missingkids.org/blog/2021/rise-in-online-enticement-and-other-trends-ncmec-releases-2020-.
2
Id. Sexual exploitation is defined as “Actual or attempted abuse of a position of
vulnerability, power, or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not limited to, profiting
monetarily, socially or politically from the sexual exploitation of another.” WORLD HEALTH
ORG., SEXUAL EXPLOITATION & ABUSE, https://www.who.int/docs/defaultsource/documents/ethics/sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-pamphleten.pdf?sfvrsn=409b4d89_2.
3
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CHILD EXPLOITATION PREVENTION
AND INTERDICTION 72 (2016), https://www.justice.gov/psc/file/842411/download.
4
Child pornography, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2256, includes any visual depiction,
whether made or produced by electronic or other means, of sexually explicit conduct where
the production involves a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 2256.
However, the term child pornography normalizes the seriousness of the offense and
downplays that child pornography always involves sexual abuse and exploitation of children.
“For child abuse and exploitation, precise language can help convey the particular gravity of
harms against children and the seriousness with which society addresses such crimes.” Mary
Graw Leary, The Language of Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation, in REFINING CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY LAW: CRIME, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 109 (Carissa B. Hessick
ed., 2016). See also Child Pornography, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminalceos/child-pornography (May 28, 2020). The term child pornography does not adequately
convey the child abuse that is required to produce this sexualized material. A more
appropriate term for child pornography is child sexual abuse material (CSAM). Glossary of
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physically forced or abducted but instead manipulated into participating.5
The trauma associated with child pornography has long-lasting effects on
child victims that go beyond the physical harm suffered. These long-lasting
harms include a wide variety of psychological, emotional, and physical
effects, such as feelings of hopelessness and worthlessness, which manifest in
a variety of symptoms.6 Victims of child sexual abuse describe feeling a sense
of shame and guilt that was still prevalent at the time the children disclosed
the abuse.7 Moreover, many victims are targeted when they are young and
are often reluctant to report their abuse because of the added feelings of
shame and guilt.8
Congress attempted to address the problem of child pornography by
passing numerous statutes with the goal of expanding the protections
afforded to children.9 Of these federal statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) targets the
production of child pornography by making it a crime to knowingly make
any notice or advertisement in an effort to receive a visual depiction of

Terms, INT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN,
https://www.icmec.org/resources/glossary/#:~:text=While%20most%20legislation%20uses%
20the,form%2C%20of%20child%20sexual%20abuse (last visited Oct. 9, 2021). “Because the
term ‘child pornography’ is used in federal statutes, it is also commonly used by lawmakers,
prosecutors, investigators and the public to describe this form of sexual exploitation of
children.” U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra; see also Leary, supra, at 109. Because of child
pornography’s use in court decisions and legislation, it is easily recognized by the public. For
this reason, this Note will refer to these images with the common term of child pornography.
5
Ateret Gewirtz-Meydan et al., The Complex Experience of Child Pornography Survivors,
80 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 238, 239 (2018). “Some offenders produce child pornography by
convincing or coercing a child to take images of himself or herself. Coercion of a child to
take nude images of himself or herself is production of child pornography.” U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N, 2012 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: FEDERAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY OFFENSES 109
(2012), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-andreports/sex-offense-topics/201212-federal-child-pornographyoffenses/Full_Report_to_Congress.pdf [hereinafter U.S. SENT’G COMM’N].
6
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 3, at 72.
7
CARL GÖRAN SVEDIN & CHRISTINA BLACK, WHY DIDN’T THEY TELL US? ON SEXUAL ABUSE
IN CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 15–16 (1st ed. 2003); Gewirtz-Meydan et al., supra note 5, at 239.
8
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 5, at 111.
9
Child pornography statutes are codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2260A. Congress’s
primary intent in passing the line of child pornography and sexual exploitation statutes is to
eliminate the exchange of child pornography. United States v. Christie, 570 F. Supp. 2d 657,
692 (D.N.J. 2008). Prior to passing this line of statutes “the Federal Government lack[ed]
sufficient enforcement tools to combat concerted efforts to exploit children prescribed by
Federal law, and exploitation victims lack effective remedies under Federal law.” Child Abuse
Victims’ Rights Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341-74 (1986).
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sexually explicit material.10 Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 2251 in 1986,
increasing the severity of violations involving the production of child
pornography to protect children from sexual predators.11 By choosing not to
convict offenders who privately invite children to create child pornography,
the courts have abandoned the children Congress intended to protect.12
Federal courts interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) frequently focus on
whether an act constituted an advertisement to receive child pornography.13
Fewer federal courts evaluated the statute from the perspective of whether an
individual knowingly made a notice seeking child pornography.14 In one such
case, United States v. Caniff, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted notice to receive
child pornography to include private, person-to-person text message
requests for explicit photos from a person believed to be a minor.15
In the 2019 opinion, the majority reasoned that Congress must have
intended notice and advertisement to have independent meanings.16
Therefore, “to make any notice,” which did not have any constraints from
Congress, simply meant to notify.17 However, the dissent disagreed, stating
that the majority’s interpretation of notice did not comport with ordinary
10
18 U.S.C. § 2251(d). Congress has not defined what types of communication constitute
making a notice or advertisement under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d).
11
18 U.S.C. § 2251(e). “Congress has recognized the physiological, psychological, and
emotional harm caused by the production, distribution, and display of child pornography by
strengthening laws prescribing such activity.” Child Abuse Victims’ Rights Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341-74 (1986) (outlining the findings that led to the 1986
Amendment increasing the punishments in 42 U.S.C. § 2251(e)).
12
In United States v. Caniff (Caniff I), 916 F.3d 929, 930 (11th Cir. 2019), the Eleventh
Circuit held that sending private person-to-person text messages constituted making a notice
to receive child pornography. However, a year later the court, sua sponte, reversed its
decision. In its reconsideration, the Eleventh Circuit held that private person-to-person text
messages were not sufficient to make a notice for child pornography. United States v. Caniff
(Caniff II), 955 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2020).
13
See generally United States v, Pabon-Cruz, 391 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v.
Rowe, 414 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Sewell, 513 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2008);
United States v. Christie, 570 F. Supp. 2d 657 (D.N.J. 2008); United States v. Peterson, No.
CR 12-228-GW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194065 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2015); United States v.
Autry, No. A-18-M-155, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56501 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2018).
14
See generally United States v. Grovo, 826 F.3d 1207, 1218 (9th Cir. 2016); United States
v. Gries, 877 F.3d 255 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Cox, 963 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2020);
United States v. Orr, 819 F. App’x 756 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. Sammons, No. 2:19cr-107, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191600 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 15, 2020).
15
Caniff I, 916 F.3d at 930.
16
Id. at 935 (“We conclude Congress must have, instead, meant that each of those
terms—‘notice or advertisement’—had an independent meaning. That is particularly true
here because Congress separated the terms notice and advertisement by the word ‘or.’”).
17
Id. at 934–35.
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English speech and that notice, as informed by the statutory context, required
a public component.18
In 2020, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case sua sponte and vacated its
previous decision.19 The court held that the term notice did not apply to
private, person-to-person communication.20 While once again reviewing the
ordinary meaning of notice, the Eleventh Circuit then found that to
“make . . . any notice” does not encompass the private communication
meanings of notice.21 Relying on the rule of lenity, the court interpreted
notice narrowly and thus found in the defendant’s favor.22
Although the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of notice was addressed
several times by federal courts, there has never been a clear and consistent
definition as to what types of communication Congress intended to
criminalize by including both notice and advertisement in the statute. To
adequately protect children, notice under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) must be
interpreted broadly to include private, person-to-person text messages. If a
broad interpretation is not adopted by the courts, Congress must amend the
statute to define “notice” or “advertisement.” Likewise, Congress should
rewrite the statute using clear language to signal Congress’s intent to protect
children from private offers to participate in child pornography.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Child Pornography in the United States

The child pornography problem did not begin with the invention of
computers. A cottage industry for child pornography developed after the
invention of the camera.23 However, the child pornography problem
expanded once predators could hide behind a computer screen. The
predator’s ability to hide created numerous challenges for law enforcement
trying to keep up with advancing technology.24
The internet created a shelter for predators—not for the child victims.
Child victims live with trauma caused by child pornography for the rest of
their lives.25 The trauma experienced by child victims prompted action by
18

Id. at 944.
Caniff II, 955 F.3d at 1185.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 1188–89.
22
Id. at 1191.
23
RICHARD WORTLEY & STEPHEN SMALLBONE, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET 1
(2006), http://www.ncdsv.org/images/cops_child-pornography-on-the-internet_5-2006.pdf.
24
MICHAEL C. SETO, Child Pornography, in INTERNET SEX OFFENDERS 37, 40 (2013).
25
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 4.
19
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Congress. Congress took action by passing a series of bills aimed at
criminalizing various aspects of the child pornography industry.26
1.

The Rise of Child Pornography

The development of the camera in the early 1800s led to an increase in the
production, trading, and collection of child pornography.27 Even with
technological advancements, most images of child pornography were
expensive and difficult to obtain.28 Although there was an increase in child
pornography production and distribution, law enforcement agencies were
able to curb the trafficking of these materials.29 Because most child
pornography was locally produced, it remained relatively obscure and
unusual until the 1970s.30 By 1977, “there were at least 260 different monthly
magazines” circulating in the United States.31 A 1985 Congressional report
estimated that child pornography had become a highly-organized cottage
industry grossing several million dollars per year, calling into question the
early 1970s figures estimating a nearly billion dollar industry.32
The prevalence of child pornography, as we know it today, did not occur
until the internet was introduced. With the rapid change in technology, the
number of photos and videos that memorialized the sexual exploitation of
children increased exponentially.33 Prior to the internet era, child
pornography was obtained by the interested party contacting commercial
distributors or individuals to purchase or trade images.34 Now, with the
internet, interested parties not only have access to more material, but they
can access it almost instantaneously with a click of a button.35 Predators,
26

See infra Section II.B.
WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 23, at 1.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 5. Child pornography produced during the 1800s, before the advent of the
internet, were “locally produced, of poor quality, expensive, and difficult to obtain.” Id. at 1.
The cottage industry of child pornography remained a mostly self-restricted enterprise
throughout much of the twentieth century allowing law enforcement agencies to be
successful in limiting the spread of traditional hard-copy forms. Id.
30
HOWARD A. DAVIDSON & GREGORY A. LOKEN, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND PROSTITUTION:
BACKGROUND AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (1987),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/109927NCJRS.pdf.
31
Id.
32
Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 99-537 (1986)). The true extent of the industry is difficult to
determine because “photographs, videotapes, and films can be taken in private homes and
distributed in clandestine underground channels.” Id.
33
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 5, at 3.
34
SETO, supra note 24, at 40.
35
See WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 23, at 9.
27
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using the internet, are now able to find and seduce potential victims; produce,
trade, or exchange pornography; and communicate with each other with little
detection.36
The internet age expanded the ability to create and distribute child
pornography into a global phenomenon.37 The global nature of the industry,
coupled with the increased anonymity of the internet, has created a vast
industry that has proven difficult for law enforcement to curb.38 North
America alone hosted the most child pornography websites globally until
2016, but there was a shift and Europe host the most child pornography
websites.39 Since 2016, Europe has hosted the most child pornography
websites.40 However, the number of websites hosted in the United States is
still staggering. In 2020, the United States was hosting 8,257 confirmed URLs
with child pornography and child sexual abuse material.41 Many websites
hosting such material remain unknown and are constantly changing.
The exact number of images and videos appearing on these websites are
difficult to determine.42 One website alone hosted over 1.3 million images
depicting more than seventy-three previously unidentified child victims.43
Additionally, while investigating a single website over a twelve-day period,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) discovered roughly 200,000
registered users and 100,000 individuals accessing the site.44 In 2020, the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children CyberTipline received
roughly 33.6 million reports of pornographic images involving children, with

36
Id.; PHILIP JENKINS, BEYOND TOLERANCE: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET 14–15
(2001).
37
Michael J. Henzey, Going on the Offensive: A Comprehensive Overview of Internet Child
Pornography Distribution and Aggressive Legal Action, 11 APPALACHIAN J.L. 1, 6 (2011).
38
SETO, supra note 24, at 41.
39
The Annual Report 2020: Geographical Hosting, IWF,
https://annualreport2020.iwf.org.uk/trends/international/geographic (last visited Feb. 23,
2022).
40
Id. As of 2020, Europe hosted 138,009 URLs with child pornography and child sexual
abuse material. Id. This was an increase from 117,359 URLs hosting these materials in 2019.
Id.
41
Id.
42
WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 27, at 12–13 (“[O]ne problem in estimating the
number of sites is that many exist only for a brief period before they are shut down, and
much of the trade in child pornography takes place at hidden levels of the Internet.”).
43
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 3, at 74; The Scourge of Child Pornography: Working to
Stop the Sexual Exploitation of Children, FBI NEWS (Apr. 25, 2017),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/the-scourge-of-child-pornography.
44
Id.
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10.4 million unique images.45 The CyberTipline also reviewed reports of 31.6
million videos of child pornography, with 3.7 million unique videos.46 The
same image or video circulating on different websites or being shared by
different people contributes to the overall number of reports being so much
greater than the unique images and videos.47
As technology continues to grow and develop so do the opportunities
available for predators to groom and entice children. The number of
smartphone users increases steadily every year. As of 2021, there were 6.64
billion smartphone users globally, or approximately 83.9% of the world
population.48 Many teenagers use smartphones to share sexually explicit
photos of themselves and social networking sites to exchange sexually
charged communications.49 According to the National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children, 90% of the reports received by its CyberTipline
involved an offender’s direct communication or attempted direct
communication with children.50 This communication is made easier with
smartphones and the amount of communication that occurs through
applications, social networking sites, or private text messages.
2.

Children as Victims in Child Pornography

The internet now “provides positive reinforcement for [child
pornographers] in their beliefs and behaviors, encouraging further
exploitation of children.”51 This positive reinforcement overshadows the fact
that the production, distribution, and possession of child pornography are all
crimes with actual victims. The increase and normalization of child
45
2019 & 2020 Total Files by Reporting Category and Type, NAT’L CTR. OF MISSING &
EXPLOITED CHILD., https://www.missingkids.org/gethelpnow/cybertipline (last visited Nov. 2,
2021).
46
Id.
47
Id. (“Children are revictimized by the continued circulation of the files of their abuse
and the technology that is used to identify these files, is critical to their protection.”).
48
Ash Turner, How Many Smartphones are in the World?, BANKMYCELL.COM,
https://www.bankmycell.com/blog/how-many-phones-are-in-the-world (last visited Feb. 7,
2022).
49
Dawn C. Nunziato, Romeo and Juliet Online and in Trouble: Criminalizing Depictions
of Teen Sexuality (c u l8r: g2g 2 jail), 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 57, 58 (2012).
50
NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILD., THE ONLINE ENTICEMENT OF CHILDREN:
AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF CYBER TIPLINE REPORTS 3 (2017),
https://www.missingkids.org/content/dam/missingkids/pdfs/ncmecanalysis/Online%20Enticement%20Pre-Travel1.pdf.
51
Debra Wong Yang & Patricia A. Donahue, Protecting Children from Online
Exploitation and Abuse: An Overview of Project Safe Childhood, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 439, 445
(2007).
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pornography and sexual exploitation of children fails to appreciate the harms
caused to the children depicted in these images, children exposed to child
pornography, and society overall. Child pornography produces a permanent
record of a child’s sexual abuse, which, when coupled with online
dissemination, causes the child to be perpetually victimized.52 A child living
with “the permanency, longevity, and circulation of [the] record”53 can
“create[] lasting psychological damage to the child.”54
The greatest harm to the young victims is the emotional and psychological
damage caused when a child is forced or manipulated to engage in sexual
acts.55 The frequency and severity of the sexual abuse, along with the age at
which it happened, combine to cause emotional harm that often extends
throughout the life of the child.56 This sexual abuse and exploitation can
create difficulty in developing healthy and affectionate relationships57
because victims “live in constant fear that images will surface and be viewed
by people they know.”58
For many children, the images of their victimization depict abuse that
began when the child was quite young and often continues for much of the
child’s life.59 According to a report by the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children, 76% of the identified victims in child pornography were
prepubescent.60 Of the prepubescent children, 10% were infants or toddlers.61
Other studies have found that about half of the victims were younger than
twelve years old.62 Due to their young age, victims often fear people will
believe they were complicit in their abuse.63 In fact, some victims may not
even understand the extent of their trauma because they were so young when
the abuse occurred.64
Much like victims of other types of sexual abuse, victims of child

52

U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 4.
Id.
54
Id.
55
T. Christopher Donnelly, Protection of Children from Use in Pornography: Toward
Constitutional and Enforceable Legislation, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 295, 299 (1979).
56
Id. at 299–300.
57
Id. at 299.
58
Gewirtz-Meydan et al., supra note 5, at 243–44.
59
Id. at 241.
60
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 5, at 108.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 111–12.
64
Id. at 108, 111.
53
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pornography are often reluctant to report their abuse.65 Some young victims
are targeted because they are non-verbal and unable to report the abuse.66
However, many victims are abused by family members who threaten the
victims using parental authority or offer various forms of payment to prevent
the victims from reporting.67 Moreover, victims may be used to recruit other
children, even their younger siblings.68 Even if the victims were not targeted
because of the greater chance of silence, simply knowing that images of the
sexual abuse and exploitation exist prevents victims from reporting the crime
due to feelings of guilt and shame.69 Other victims worry they will be
recognized by those viewing the images.70
For victims, the knowledge that images of their sexual abuse exist can
exacerbate the trauma.71 For instance, victims of child pornography are at
greater risk of depression, poor self-esteem, interpersonal problems,
delinquency, substance abuse, suicidal thoughts, and post-traumatic stress
disorder.72 The lack of control over images can be one of the most difficult
aspects of the abuse to overcome.73 Although not all child pornography
depicts violent sexual abuse, it is all produced through the sexual exploitation
of children. This means that the victims suffer from the knowledge that their
image is being used for sexual gratification or to groom new victims.74 Some
victims have even reported they were tracked down and stalked by viewers of
their images.75
B.

Federal Response to the Child Pornography Problem

Until 1977, there was no federal legislation that criminalized the
production of sexually explicit images of children.76 Prosecutors had been
relying on state “rape, incest and child welfare statutes to punish those who
65

Id. at 111.
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 5, at 108, 111.
67
Id. at 109–10.
68
Id. at 110 n.10 (“Sometimes these are siblings sets and sometimes an initial victim may
be encouraged by the offender to ‘recruit’ another child.”); Janis Wolak et al., Arrests for
Child Pornography Production: Data at Two Time Points from a National Sample of U.S. Law
Enforcement Agencies, 16 CHILD MALTREATMENT 184, 190 (2011).
69
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 5, at 111.
70
Gewirtz-Meydan et al., supra note 5, at 241.
71
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 5, at 112.
72
Id. at 113.
73
Gewirtz-Meydan et al., supra note 5, at 244.
74
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 5, at 113.
75
Id.
76
WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 27, at 4–5; DAVIDSON & LOKEN, supra note 30, at 7.
66
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sexually exploited children.”77 Congress passed the Protection of Children
Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 in response to the storm of media
attention that put the issue of child pornography on the national agenda.78 A
Congressional investigation of the child pornography industry revealed that
the production, distribution, and sale of child pornography was comprised
of a loose network of clandestine operations that made a wide variety of
sexually explicit material available in most parts of the country.79 Finding the
current federal statutes did not protect children or society from the “highly
organized, multi-million dollar” nationwide industry of child pornography,
Congress declared that more focused legislation was needed to fill the voids
in current federal law.80
The 1977 Act prohibited the use of children under the age of sixteen in the
production of pornographic materials.81 The 1977 Act also prohibited the
knowing sale of or distribution of child pornographic images used for
commercial purposes.82 The 1977 Act explicitly prohibited “any obscene
material depicting a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”83 For
purposes of the 1977 Act, sexually explicit conduct did not include a
provision for nudity but included the phrase “lewd exhibition of the genitals
or pubic area.”84
77
David P. Shouvlin, Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535, 537–38 (1981).
78
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92
Stat. 7 (1978) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–53, 2423); Artemus Ward, Protection of
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, THE FIRST AMEND. ENCYC.,
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1088/protection-of-children-against-sexualexploitation-act-of-1977 (last visited Jan. 13, 2022).
79
S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 5 (1977).
80
S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 3, 5 (1977). Law enforcement agencies documented the presence
of major production centers in many large cities including Los Angeles, Chicago, and New
York City, as well as the existence of smaller independent producers around the country. S.
REP. NO. 95-438, at 6 (1977).
81
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 99-225, 92
Stat. 7, 8 (1978) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–53, 2423); Annemarie J. Mazzone,
Comment, United States v. Knox: Protecting Children from Sexual Exploitation Through the
Federal Child Pornography Laws, 5 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 167, 178
(1994).
82
Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L. REV. 847, 855
(2008).
83
Mazzone, supra note 81, at 178–79. Although Congress believed that only obscene
child pornography could be constitutionally banned, as outlined in Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973), it still could not define what kind of images would be considered obscene. Id.
at 177 n.50.
84
Id. at 176.
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Shortly after the 1977 Act passed, the United States Supreme Court
identified child pornography as a new category of unprotected speech in New
York v. Ferber.85 The Court held that the production and distribution of child
pornography is intrinsically related to the sexual exploitation and abuse of
children and did not warrant First Amendment protection.86 Ferber allowed
state legislatures to regulate non-obscene child pornography.87 However, the
Court’s decision in Ferber frustrated the purpose of the 1977 Act because the
types of images that could be banned under the Act were limited only to those
that were considered obscene.88
After the decision in Ferber and a review of the 1977 Act, Congress passed
the Child Protection Act of 1984.89 The 1984 Act eliminated the 1977 Act’s
obscenity requirement, sale requirement, and commercial purpose
requirement.90 The new Act added an offense for knowingly reproducing any
visual depiction of children engaging in sexually explicit conduct through the
mail.91 The 1984 Act also redefined sexually explicit conduct by changing
“lewd” to “lascivious” exhibition of the genitals, to clarify that obscenity was
not necessary for these visual depictions to qualify.92
Although the 1984 Act produced Congress’s desired result, as “federal
prosecutions increased dramatically,”93 Congress continued to “examine the
seriousness of [] child pornography.”94 In 1985, President Reagan established
the Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography to “determine the
nature, extent, and impact” of pornography on society in the United States to
recommend ways to stop its spread.95 The report found that the production
and the distribution of child pornography is a form of sexual exploitation that
causes serious harm to the children involved.96 The report echoed the Ferber
85

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982); Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Limits of
Child Pornography, 89 IND. L.J. 1437, 1443–44 (2014); Mazzone, supra note 81, at 180.
86
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
87
Mazzone, supra note 81, at 182.
88
Id.
89
Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (current version at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2251–55); Mazzone, supra note 81, at 182, 185.
90
Mazzone, supra note 81, at 185.
91
Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (current version at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2251–55); Mazzone, supra note 81, at 185–86.
92
Child Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204, 205 (current version at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2251–55); Mazzone, supra note 81, at 186.
93
Mazzone, supra note 81, at 186.
94
Id.
95
Richard E. McLawhorn, Summary of the Report by the Attorney General’s Commission
on Pornography, 74 LINACRE Q. 313, 313 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
96
Id. at 330–31. See supra Section II.A.2 for a discussion of all of the harms faced by the
child victims of child pornography.
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Court’s belief that the market for child pornography may decrease with the
stringent enforcement of existing laws and impactful sanctions, which may,
in turn, reduce the production of child pornography.97 Recognizing the
significant harm the production and distribution of child pornography
caused, Congress passed the Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of
1986.98
The 1986 Act added a ban on advertisements related to the sexual
exploitation of children.99 Congress further added a clarification to “visual
depictions” to include undeveloped film.100 With the increased access to
computers and use of the internet, Congress continued to address emerging
issues regarding child pornography. In 1988, Congress passed the Child
Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act,101 the first statute to address the
technological developments that facilitated the expansion of online child
pornography.102 The 1988 Act criminalized the transmission, distribution, or
reception of child pornography using a computer.103 The Child Protection
Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990 expanded criminal
penalties for individuals who knowingly possessed child pornography.104
The growth of the internet and the continual advances in computer
technology led to concerns that the existing legislation was out of date. The
Child Pornography Prevention Act of1996 amended federal laws to address
the sexual exploitation of children and the growth of new technological
advances.105 The 1996 Act expanded the breadth of child pornography law
97

U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY 416–17, 659–
60 (1986) (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760 (1982)).
98
See generally Child Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-628, 100
Stat. 3510 (1986) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2255, 2421–24).
99
Id.
100
Mazzone, supra note 81, at 187.
101
Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102
Stat. 4485 (1988) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–52, 2256).
102
See id. (“[A]mend[ing] by inserting ‘by any means including by computer’ after
‘interstate or foreign commerce’ both places it appears” in § 2251(c), prior to its change
to § 2251(d)); Mary G. Leary, Protecting Children from Child Pornography and the Internet,
CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION PROGRAM UPDATE (Am. Prosecutors Rsch. Inst., Alexandria,
Va.), Nov. 4, 2004, at 1 (“Also to follow was the Child Protection and Obscenity
Enforcement Act of 1988, which addressed for the first time the relationship between
computer technology and child pornography.”).
103
Id.
104
Child Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-647, 104 Stat. 4816 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2252).
105
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3026–
27 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–52).
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from the actual sexual abuse of children to include digitally created images of
children engaged in sexually explicit activity.106 Additionally, the 1996 Act
banned the production and distribution of morphed or “virtual” child
pornography.107 Since 1996, major decisions and legislation have focused on
other aspects of child pornography, like virtual pornography, while
leaving § 2251(d) untouched.108
III. PROBLEM
A.

Statutory Definitions Regarding the Sexual Exploitation of Children

Child pornography is not protected under the First Amendment and is
subject to federal statute restrictions.109 Chapter 110 of Title 18 of the United
States Code110 codifies prohibitions to almost all aspects of child
pornography, including the production, distribution, and possession of child
pornography through any means of interstate or foreign commerce.111
Violations of these federal child pornography statutes are serious offenses
and those convicted under these statutes face severe penalties. The severe
punishments highlight the desire to protect children from the physical and
psychological abuse of producing and distributing child pornography.112
To grasp the extent of these statutes it is important to know what is
classified as child pornography or a visual depiction of sexually explicit
conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) defines child pornography as any “visual
depiction” of a minor “engaging in sexually explicit conduct,” “including any
photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image
or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other
means . . . .”113 The section goes on to define “sexually explicit conduct” as
actual or simulated sexual intercourse, bestiality, or “lascivious exhibition of
106

A Brief Overview of Child Pornography Laws and Key Problems, STOBBS L. OFF.,
http://www.stobbslaw.com/blog/2014/05/a-brief-overview-of-child-pornography-laws-andkey-problems/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2022).
107
Id.
108
PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003); see generally Ashcroft
v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002).
109
See generally New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
110
18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2260A.
111
Citizen’s Guide to U.S. Federal Law on Child Pornography, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/citizens-guide-us-federal-law-child-pornography
(May 28, 2020); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 5, at 21–22.
112
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 756, 756–58 (1982). See also Hessick, supra note 85, at
1444 (“The Court identified two major harms to children caused by child pornography: the
harm of creation and the harm of circulation.”).
113
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8).
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the anus, genitals, or pubic area . . . .”114 Although lascivious exhibition is not
defined by statute, courts addressed it by using a six-prong standard from
United States v. Dost.115 The factors from Dost include:
(1) whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on
the child's genitalia or pubic area; (2) whether the setting of
the visual depiction is sexually suggestive, i.e., in a place or
pose generally associated with sexual activity; (3) whether
the child is depicted in an unnatural pose, or in
inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child; (4)
whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or nude; (5)
whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coyness or a
willingness to engage in sexual activity; (6) whether the
visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit a sexual
response in the viewer.116
18 U.S.C. § 2251 prohibits the persuasion, inducement, enticement, or
coercion of a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct in an effort to
produce a visual depiction of that conduct.117 More specifically,
18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1) provides that “[a]ny person who . . . knowingly makes,
prints, or publishes, . . . any notice or advertisement seeking or offering [] to
receive . . . any visual depiction . . . involv[ing] the use of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct,” shall be sentenced to 15 to 30 years in prison.118
The section also prohibits knowingly making a notice or advertisement
seeking or offering participation in any act of sexual explicit conduct with a
minor for the purpose of producing sexually explicit material.119 Conviction
of a production offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2251, even production solely for
personal use, faces a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years of
imprisonment with a maximum of thirty years.120 The statutory minimums
and maximums are higher for those defendants with prior sexual offenses.121

114

18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A).
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 5, at 23, 23 n.17.
116
Id. at 23 n.17 (quoting United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986)).
117
18 U.S.C. § 2251(a).
118
18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
119
18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1)(B).
120
18 U.S.C. § 2251(e); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 5, at 24.
121
The minimum for defendants with one previous sexual offense is a mandatory twentyfive-year sentence while the maximum penalty is fifty years. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note
5, at 24. If the defendants have more than one previous sexual offense the mandatory
minimum sentence is thirty-five years with a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Id.
115
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Federal Cases Involving 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)

Congress’s goal in drafting 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) was to craft a statute that
captured all types of communication as either advertisements or notices
targeting individuals interested in child pornography.122 Although federal
cases have considered both aspects of the statute, there are far more cases that
address advertisements as it relates to public communications.123 Cases
focusing on advertisements involve conversations initiated through peer-topeer file sharing, large chat rooms, and online message boards.124 Cases that
define notice occur less frequently.125 In those cases, courts focused on
whether a private, person-to-person communication or messages between
users of a private website were intended to be prohibited by the statute.126
Unfortunately, each case involving notice is dramatically different—with
very few comparable facts—and have not led to a clear consistent definition.
While there have been federal cases focusing on whether a defendant’s
action satisfies the meaning of notice under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d), few, if any,
have held that private, person-to-person communication qualifies as a notice
to receive child pornography. Many cases brought under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)
involved a notice or advertisement between distributors and consumers of
child pornography.127 Therefore, cases involving the direct communication
between an adult seeking sexually explicit photographs from a minor are
subject to varying decisions.128 The varying decisions undermine the goals of
protecting children from sexual exploitation and ending the child
pornography market.129
1.

How Have Federal Courts Interpreted Notice and
Advertisement?

Federal cases first considered whether public communications constituted

122

United States v. Franklin, 785 F.3d 1365, 1369–70 (10th Cir. 2015).
See generally cases cited supra note 13.
124
See generally United States v. Rowe, 414 F.3d 271, 273 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v.
Autry, No. A-18-M-155, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56501, at *2–3 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2018).
125
See generally cases cited supra note 14.
126
See generally United States v. Gries, 877 F.3d 255 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Cox,
963 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2020); United States v. Orr, 819 F. App’x 756 (11th Cir. 2020); United
States v. Sammons, No. 2:19-cr-107, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191600 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 15, 2020).
127
See infra Section III.B.1.a–e.
128
See Caniff I, 916 F.3d 929, 930 (11th Cir. 2019), vacated, 955 F.3d 1183, 1185 (2020).
129
Caniff II, 955 F.3d 1183, 1192; United States v. Christie, 570 F. Supp. 2d 657, 665
(D.N.J. 2008) (discussing the primary intent of Congress in relation to 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)).
123
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advertisements under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d).130 As new technology and online
platforms developed, the idea that smaller group communication—and even
private communication—can satisfy an advertisement seemed to fade.
Courts began treating communication between smaller groups of people as
“making a notice” to receive child pornography rather than an
advertisement.131 Defendants usually challenge cases that involve large
groups within the online community, or the public at large, on whether the
communication in question was an advertisement to receive child
pornography.132
In 2016, in United States v. Grovo, the Ninth Circuit evaluated whether an
online bulletin board shared between forty to forty-five users was an
advertisement under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d).133 This case is one of the few that
has looked at a small online community to see if the posting constituted an
advertisement. The Ninth Circuit ultimately held that advertising to a
particular subset of the public is sufficient to sustain a conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 2251(d).134 This holding was consistent with other circuit courts that
held closed communications could be advertisements under the statute.135
However, soon those other circuits began evaluating smaller subsections of
the public as notice to receive child pornography instead of an
advertisement.136
a.

United States v. Grovo

In United States v. Grovo, Steven Grovo used an online bulletin board to
exchange child pornography with forty to forty-five members.137 The bulletin
board in question was an invitation-only message board for sharing both
pornographic and non-pornographic images of children.138 New members
were allowed to join only after being invited by an existing member and

130

See generally United States v, Pabon-Cruz, 391 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v.
Rowe, 414 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Sewell, 513 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2008);
Christie, 570 F. Supp. 2d 657; United States v. Peterson, No. CR 12-228-GW, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 194065 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2015); United States v. Autry, No. A-18-M-155, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 56501 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 3, 2018).
131
See generally Gries, 877 F.3d 255; Cox, 963 F.3d 915; Orr, 819 F. App’x 756; Sammons,
No. 2:19-cr-107, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191600.
132
See Rowe, 414 F.3d at 276; Autry, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56501, at *1.
133
United States v. Grovo, 826 F.3d 1207, 1211, 1219 (9th Cir. 2016).
134
Id. at 1218.
135
See infra Section III.B.1.a–e.
136
See id.
137
Grovo, 826 F.3d at 1211–12.
138
Id. at 1211.
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vetted by the site administrators to ensure that they could be trusted.139 The
online message board was divided into several different boards and included
several levels of membership.140 Grovo posted on the message board 330
times and actively engaged in the threads of other members.141 These posts
caused prosecutors to charge Grovo with conspiracy to advertise child
pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d).142
Grovo argued that the posts made on the message board did not constitute
an advertisement for child pornography as the posts were only visible to
members and not to the general public.143 The Ninth Circuit turned to
various dictionary definitions to determine whether an advertisement
required a public component.144 Almost all of the dictionary definitions
included a public component but did not require a public component to the
communication.145 The court did not adopt the interpretation that an
advertisement must be targeted to the public as a whole.146 Rather, the court
determined that an advertisement can be made to a subset of the public.147 If
an advertisement can be made to the public at large, or a subset of the public,
then to have 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) encompass all types of communication, a
139

Id. at 1211–12. The site administrators did not outline the criteria for trusting a new
member before they could begin posting in the various rooms that focused on different
content areas. Id. at 1211.
140
Id. at 1211–12.
141
Id. at 1212.
142
Id. at 1211.
143
Grovo, 826 F.3d at 1217.
144
Id. Webster’s Dictionary has several definitions including, “a calling to public
attention: publicity” and “a public notice; esp: a paid notice or announcement published in
some public print . . . or broadcast over radio or television.” Id. (quoting Advertisement,
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 31 (2002)). The American Heritage
Dictionary defines an advertisement as a “notice, such as a poster or a paid announcement in
the print, broadcast, or electronic media, designed to attract public attention or patronage.”
Id. at 1217 (quoting Advertisement, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 25 (5th ed. 2011)).
While Black’s Law Dictionary had the narrowest definition of advertisement, defining it as a
“commercial solicitation; an item of published or transmitted matter made with the
intention of attracting clients or customers.” Id. (quoting Advertisement, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)).
145
Grovo, 826 F.3d at 1217–18 (“To be sure, four of the five definitions above involve
some form of ‘public notice’ or calling ‘public attention’ to something. Although this
supports the defendants’ argument that an ‘advertisement’ may require some public
component, it does not compel us to adopt their argument that an ‘advertisement’ must be
targeted to the entire public as a whole.”).
146
Id. at 1218.
147
Id. at 1217–18 (“The means of publication or broadcast are not the definitive features
of an ‘advertisement,’ so long as the advertisement calls attention to its subject or makes a
particular thing known.”).
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notice should include private communications.
b.

United States v. Franklin

In United States v. Franklin, the Tenth Circuit did not distinguish between
notice and advertisement when evaluating Franklin’s communication to his
“friends” on a website.148 The prosecutor charged Franklin with advertising
or providing notice of images of child pornography when he made child
pornography images available to his 108 friends on a website called
“Gigatribe.”149 On Gigatribe, a user could approve other users to become his
“friends” who would then be allowed to view previews of pornographic
images posted by other users.150 Franklin was able to choose which
pornographic images would be shared with his friends which allowed those
friends access.151 Once a friend had access, they could select images to
download and share.152
The prosecutor argued that when the defendant shared images with his
friends the defendant’s act constituted an advertisement or notice of child
pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d).153 The defendant argued that the
statute was “limited to impersonal and indiscriminate communications to
the public” and that Gigatribe, as a closed network, did not fit that
description.154 The Tenth Circuit held that limiting the statute to impersonal
and indiscriminate communication to the public was inconsistent with the
ordinary meaning of notice or advertisement within the statute.155 When the
court interprets the words in a statute, it should attempt to capture all
advertisements or notices targeting individuals interested in obtaining or
distributing child pornography.156
c.

United States v. Gries

In United States v. Gries, the defendant challenged the definition of notice
148

See United States v. Franklin, 785 F.3d 1365, 1369 (10th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1367.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Franklin, 785 F.3d at 1367.
155
Id. at 1367–68. Only two of the six definitions of advertisement provided in the
opinion contained a public component. Additionally, Webster’s Dictionary provided
eighteen definitions of notice, none of which contained a public component. Id. at 1368.
156
Id. at 1369–70 (“Congress surely did not intend to limit the statute’s reach to
pedophiles who indiscriminately advertise through traditional modes of communication like
television or radio.”).
149
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under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d).157 The Seventh Circuit held that the messages in a
password-protected online chatroom were sufficient to support a conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d).158 John Gries was an active user in a private online
chatroom where large amounts of child pornography had been traded for
nearly a decade.159 The password-protected private chatroom facilitated the
private communications of users to exchange massive amounts of child
pornography.160 Altogether, thirty-five to forty users shared thousands of files
depicting the violent sexual abuse of children.161 Each user had a password
that allowed access to the encrypted files.162 When there were new files to
share, the users would message other users describing the new content and
offering it for distribution.163 The prosecutor charged Gries with conspiracy
to sexually exploit a child under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d), among other conspiracy
charges.164
While the court primarily focused on the Double Jeopardy Clause, it also
discussed the sufficiency of evidence to support a charge of conspiracy to
sexually exploit a child.165 On appeal, the defendant argued that notice or
advertisement included both a public component and that the use of a
private, password-protected chatroom did not satisfy this requirement.166
The court focused on the ordinary meaning of notice when it held that the
messages in the password-protected online chatroom were sufficient to
support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d).167 Notice is a “warning or
intimation of something” and does not specify that the warning need to be
disseminated to the public at large.168
d.

United States v. Cox

In June 2020 in United States v. Cox, the Ninth Circuit held that one-toone communication is sufficient to satisfy the notice requirement in 18
U.S.C. § 2251(d).169 Cox began using Kik Messenger, an online instant
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169

United States v. Gries, 877 F.3d 255, 260 (7th Cir. 2017).
Id.
Id. at 257.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Gries, 877 F.3d at 257.
Id. at 257–58.
Id. at 258–60.
Id. at 258, 260.
Id. at 260.
Id.
United States v. Cox, 963 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2020).
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messaging platform, to engage in conversations with Richard Hennis.170 The
conversations included the two discussing their mutual interest in child
sexual intercourse.171 In a later conversation, Cox asked Hennis to send her
child pornography videos, a request with which Hennis complied by sending
eleven files.172 After several weeks, Cox sent two Dropbox links to Hennis via
Kik Messenger containing child pornography videos and photographs.173
After sending the Dropbox links, the prosecutor charged Cox with five
child pornography-related charges, including one count of making a notice
offering child pornography.174 At trial, the jury found Cox guilty on all counts
including “‘mak[ing]’ a ‘notice . . . offering’ to ‘display, distribute, or
reproduce’ child pornography.”175 Arguing that only a notice distributed to a
wider audience violates 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d), Cox appealed her conviction
claiming that a one-to-one communication cannot support a conviction for
“making a notice offering” for child pornography under 18
U.S.C. § 2251(d).176 Based on its review of plain statutory language, the court
held “that one-to-one communications can satisfy the legal definition of
‘notice’ under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1).”177
e.

United States v. Sammons

More recently, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio questioned whether a defendant’s one-on-one online chats with an
FBI agent constituted making a notice for child pornography.178 This was the
first case holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1)(A) clearly intended to include
any kind of notice.179 Unlike the prior cases outlined above, the facts of United

170

Id. at 918.
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 919.
175
Cox, 963 F.3d at 923.
176
Id. at 919–20.
177
Id. at 925.
178
See United States v. Sammons, No. 2:19-cr-107, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191600, at *12
(S.D. Ohio Oct. 15, 2020).
179
This case was decided in October of 2020, after the decision and revision of Caniff.
The Sammons court criticized Caniff II and the court’s interpretation of notice. Id. at *18–22.
Three months after the Caniff II decision, the Eleventh Circuit found one-to-one text
messages sufficient for a conviction under § 2251(d). Id. at *15–16. The court made no
mention of the holding in the 2020 Caniff decision or tried to rationalize the differences in
the holding. Id.
171
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States v. Sammons are the most analogous to the private, person-to-person
text messages discussed below in United States v. Caniff.180
In Sammons, the defendant began a conversation with FBI Special Agent
Richard Hurst on a social media mobile application about their “mutual
sexual interest in children.”181 Sammons admitted to abusing a six-year-old
family member, and Hurst, in an effort to build a rapport, disclosed he had
abused a fictitious minor in his family.182 After sharing these details,
Sammons offered to share his family member with Hurst before moving their
conversation to the Kik mobile application.183 The two began conversing
about videos they each had and were willing to share.184 This ultimately led
to Sammons asking for photos of Hurst’s fictitious family member and
sending photos of his six-year-old family member in a bathing suit.185
Sammons had similar conversations with another user on Kik offering to
share videos of minors.186 As a result, Sammons was indicted for making a
notice for child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d), along with
several other charges.187
The crux of Sammons’s argument stemmed from the belief that notice did
not “apply to non-public, one-to-one communications, and the rule of lenity
should be applied in his favor.”188 The court sought to read the words of the
statute while applying “straightforward and commonsense meanings.”189 The
court was not convinced that notice was limited by audience size.190 The court
observed that none of the dictionary definitions of notice referenced

180
Compare Sammons, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191600 (involving communication that
began on a social media application before moving the private conversation off the
application) with Caniff I, 916 F.3d 929, and Caniff II, 955 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2020)
(involving communication that started on an anonymous social media application before
beginning private, person-to-person communication).
181
Sammons, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191600, at *2.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id. at *3–4.
185
Id. at *4.
186
Id. at *4–6.
187
Sammons, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191600, at *7–8.
188
Id. at *13. Sammons made the same arguments that were made in the 2019 Caniff
dissent and the 2020 Caniff majority. See Caniff I, 916 F.3d at 942–46 (Newsom, J.,
dissenting); Caniff II, 955 F.3d at 1185.
189
Sammons, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191600, at *17 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Black v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 973 F.3d 576, 581–82 (6th Cir. 2020)).
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Id. at *19.
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audience size or required a public component to the communication.191
Ultimately, the court held that the use of notice in 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) was
sufficiently broad to encompass one-on-one Kik chats because to make a
notice was synonymous with “notify,” not advertisement.192 Notifications can
be personal and so can a notice under18 U.S.C. § 2251(d).
2.

Challenging the Definition of Notice: United States v.
Caniff

United States v. Caniff, along with Cox, highlights the uncertainty circuit
courts have in determining Congress’s intent by including both
advertisement and notice in 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d). In 2019, the Eleventh
Circuit, in United States v. Caniff held that notice, as written in 18
U.S.C. § 2251(d), includes private person-to-person text message requests for
child pornography to a person believed to be a minor.193 However, in 2020,
the Eleventh Circuit reviewed and reversed its decision.194
In March 2016, thirty-two-year-old Matthew Caniff responded to a nonsuggestive photo posted by a “thirteen-year-old girl” on an app that allowed
anonymous communication between users.195 Caniff exchanged several
messages with “Mandy” before moving to private text messages.196 After a
series of text messages, Caniff sent unsolicited photos of himself and asked
her to do the same.197 He was arrested and charged with three child
pornography production offenses including “making a ‘notice’” seeking to
receive child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1)(A).198 At
trial, he was convicted on all counts.199
During jury deliberation, a question arose regarding the definition of

191

Id. at *18–19 (“As the Cox court observed, none of these definitions makes reference
to an audience size, or limits the word’s meaning to publicly available communications.”).
192
Id. at *20–22 (“The statute communicates to the reader that a ‘notice’ is different from
an ‘advertisement’ by use of the disjunctive ‘or.’”). Additionally, “‘make a notice’ is
synonymous with ‘notify’—a word regularly used by the average speaker of American
English to describe both private and public communications.” Id. at *21–22.
193
Caniff I, 916 F.3d 929, 930.
194
Caniff II, 955 F.3d at 1185.
195
Caniff I, 916 F.3d at 930–31; Caniff II, 955 F.3d at 1185 (“As part of the operation, FBI
Special Agent Abbigail Beccaccio posed as ‘Mandy,’ a thirteen-year-old girl, on ‘Whisper.’”).
196
Caniff I, 916 F.3d at 930–31; Caniff II, 955 F.3d at 1185–86.
197
Caniff I, 916 F.3d at 931; Caniff II, 955 F.3d at 1186.
198
Caniff I, 916 F.3d at 930–31; Caniff II, 955 F.3d 1185–86.
199
Caniff I, 916 F.3d at 930–32; Caniff II, 955 F.3d at 1187.
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notice within the charged statute.200 However, the trial court did not provide
a definition.201 Because Congress declined to provide a definition for the term
“notice,” the appellate court looked to the ordinary, everyday meaning of the
word.202 Caniff’s argument centered around the belief that notice must be
sent to the general public and private text messages do not fit within the
meaning of notice as provided by the statute.203 Ultimately the court
disagreed and held that “notice,” as provided in the statute, was broad enough
to include private, person-to-person text messages.204
In 2020, the Eleventh Circuit reconsidered United States v. Caniff and
vacated its prior decision.205 In deciding that the definition of notice did not
include private communication, the court used many of the same techniques
used in the prior decision to determine its meaning.206 The court’s rationale
was similar to its 2019 decision. However, this time it reached the exact
opposite result.207 Ultimately, the court held that “knowingly
mak[ing] . . . any notice . . . seeking or offering [child pornography]” is not
applicable to private, person-to-person text messages.208
C.

Statutory Interpretation to Clarify the Definition of Notice

Because the text of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) provides little to no context for the
meaning of “notice” or “advertisement,” the federal courts have used cases,
as discussed above, to define the terms. The courts that have interpreted the
definition of notice or advertisement utilized a variety of canons of statutory
interpretation.209 Some of these canons include ordinary meaning, whole act,

200

Caniff I, 916 F.3d at 932 (“Jurors deliberated for thirty minutes before they sent the
court a question, inquiring: ‘What is the definition of the term “notice” in Count Two, or
should we determine the definition?’”).
201
Id.
202
Id. at 933.
203
Id.
204
Id. at 936.
205
Caniff II, 955 F.3d at 1185.
206
Id. at 1192.
207
Compare Caniff I, 916 F.3d at 931 (holding that private, person-to-person
communication does constitute notice under 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (d)) with Caniff II, 955 F.3d at
1186 (holding that holding that private, person-to-person communication does not
constitute notice under 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (d)).
208
Caniff II, 955 F.3d at 1192 (alterations in original).
209
See generally United States v. Grovo, 826 F.3d 1207, 1218 (9th Cir. 2016); United
States v. Gries, 877 F.3d 255 (7th Cir. 2017); United States v. Cox, 963 F.3d 915 (9th Cir.
2020); United States v. Orr, 819 F. App’x 756 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. Sammons,
No. 2:19-cr-107, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191600 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 15, 2020).
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and noscitur a sociis.210 While courts used these canons, there are several
others that could have been used to reconcile the gaps that still exist in the
definition of notice. However, statutory canons are not mechanical rules that
provide assurances as to the interpretation of the law.211 They are interpretive
in nature and allow judges to gain insight into statutes.212
1.

Ordinary Meaning of Notice and Advertisement

When determining the definition of “advertisement” and “notice,” the
courts began by looking at the ordinary meaning.213 The ordinary meaning is
the anchor for statutory interpretation.214 The ordinary meaning rule applies
the meaning “a reasonable reader would derive from the text of the law.”215
However, there is no standardized method for how judges should go about
determining a statute’s meaning.
Judges and laypeople interpret the meaning of words similarly.216 A study
conducted by Professor Kevin Tobia showed that judges and laypeople, along
with law students, similarly categorized certain specific terms.217 Therefore,
judges should provide a fair reading of the statute’s language “as it would be
understood by the audience” of the statute—the general public.218 This
process often starts by turning to the dictionary definition of the word in
question.
In United States v. Caniff, the court sought to determine if the ordinary
meaning of advertisement was broad enough to include private, person-toperson text messages.219 The ordinary meaning of “advertisement” is “a
public, and typically commercial, statement.”220 An advertisement is not
limited to communications that are “published in the press or broadcast over
210

Caniff II, 955 F.3d at 1188–1190.
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ STATUTES
AND THE CONSTITUTION 20 (2016).
212
Id.
213
Caniff II, 955 F.3d at 1187–88; United States v. Gries, 877 F.3d 255, 260 (7th Cir.
2017); United States v. Franklin, 785 F.3d 1365, 1367–68 (10th Cir. 2015).
214
ESKRIDGE, supra note 211, at 34–35.
215
Id. at 33.
216
See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Metarules for Ordinary Meaning, 134 HARV. L. REV. F. 167
(2021).
217
The judges, laypeople, and law students were asked to categorize specific items, like
car, bus, canoe, and rollerblades, into vehicle or nonvehicle. Kevin P. Tobia, Testing
Ordinary Meaning, 135 HARV. L. REV. 726, 766–67 (2020).
218
ESKRIDGE, supra note 211, at 43.
219
Caniff II, 955 F.3d at 1187–88.
220
Id. at 1188.
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the air.”221 As the court in United States v. Grovo held, an advertisement
requires “some public component” but does not require that the
communication target the “public as a whole.”222 When Congress passed 18
U.S.C. § 2251 in 1986, one of the definitions included in Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary was “a public notice.”223 The definitive feature of an
advertisement is that the subject of the advertisement is brought to the
attention of the audience.224
Because private text messages are not public or commercial, they do not
fit under the ordinary meaning of advertisement. If courts cannot reconcile
a defendant’s actions under the interpretation of advertisement, then courts
should determine whether the actions fall under notice. The dictionary
provides many definitions of notice.225 Black’s Law Dictionary defined
“notice” as “[a] written or printed announcement.”226 The ordinary meaning
established in Gries stated that “notice” was a “warning or intimation of
something.”227 The court reasoned that the ordinary meaning was not limited
to warnings made to the general public.228 The court in Sammons likened
notice to “to notify” and attributed “to notify” to both public and private
communication.229
Unlike the Caniff court’s definition of advertisement, notice does not
contain a public component. The court in Cox found that the definition of
notice made no reference to audience size.230 In United States v. Franklin, the
court cited eighteen definitions of notice, none of which required a public
component.231 Yet, the Caniff court in 2020 stated that some definitions of
notice refer solely to public communication.232 One definition the court cited
221

United States v. Grovo, 826 F.3d 1207, 1217–18 (9th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1218.
223
United States v. Sammons, No. 2:19-cr-107, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191600, at *20–21
(S.D. Ohio Oct. 15, 2020) (quoting Advertisement, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (1986)).
224
Grovo, 826 F.3d at 1217–18.
225
See generally Notice, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/notice
(last visited Mar. 11, 2022).
226
Caniff I, 916 F.3d at 933 (alteration in original) (quoting Notice, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)).
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United States v. Gries, 877 F.3d 255, 260 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Notice, WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002)).
228
Id.
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United States v. Sammons, No. 2:19-cr-107, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191600, at *21–22
(S.D. Ohio Oct. 15, 2020).
230
United States v. Cox, 963 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 2020).
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United States v. Franklin, 785 F.3d 1365, 1368 (10th Cir. 2015).
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Caniff II, 955 F.3d at 1188.
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defined notice as “[a] displayed sign or placard giving news or
information.”233 Other statutes, like 18 U.S.C. app. § 2G2.2(c)(1),234 also
include the word “notice,” and courts have determined that notice includes
“one-on-one communication [such] as emails and instant messag[es].”235
Some courts, like the Third Circuit, include private text messages as a form
of notice when applying sentencing guidelines.236 Therefore, it is possible for
courts to adopt an ordinary meaning of notice that includes one-to-one
communication.
In 2019, the Caniff court, like most courts interpreting the definitions in
18 U.S.C. § 2251(d), found notice to include private, person-to-person
communication.237 However, when the Caniff court revisited its decision in
2020, the ordinary meaning of notice was no longer persuasive. In 2019, the
dissent argued that because there were multiple ordinary meanings, the best
meaning came from the context of the statute.238 Evaluating the context of the
statute was not necessary as the ordinary meaning established that notice or
advertisement definitely encompassed public communication but did not
require the public component. Therefore, whether notice encompassed
private, person-to-person communication is clarified by the term’s ordinary
meaning.
2.

Whole Act

The 2019 dissenting judges in Caniff was not convinced by the majority’s
focus on the ordinary meaning of notice but felt the definition of notice
should be determined by the context provided by 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) as a

233
Id. at 1189 (alteration in original) (quoting Notice, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY,
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/128591 (last visited Jan. 20, 2022)).
234
U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(c)(1) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021). The
application note to subsection (c)(1) construes a broad application of the statute. The note to
subsection (c)(1) explains the following:

The cross reference in subsection (c)(1) is to be construed broadly and
includes all instances where the offense involved employing, using,
persuading, inducing, enticing, coercing, transporting, permitting, or
offering or seeking by notice or advertisement, a minor to engage in
sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual
depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting live any
visual depiction of such conduct.
Id. § 2G2.2 cmt. n.7(A) (emphasis added).
235
Caniff I, 916 F.3d at 935–36.
236
Id. at 936.
237
Id.
238
Id. at 942 (Newsom, J., dissenting).
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whole.239 Reading one term in one sentence of a statute in isolation does not
always clear the ambiguity.240 In these cases, courts should read the term in
the context of the statute as a whole. The whole act rule provides an
understanding of what the ordinary meaning of the statute might be.241
The 2019 dissent started its wholistic analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) by
looking at the words surrounding notice or advertisement.242 The dissent
focused on “make[]” in relation to “print[] or publish[],” which appear in the
same series.243 The use of print or publish eliminated the interpretation of
“make” that included to make an offer or request.244 The phrase “make any
notice” is not one that an ordinary English speaker would use to
communicate notice’s ordinary meanings.245 Ordinary English speakers
would say they are “giving notice” when referring to a single private
communication.246
Interpreting the whole act also requires evaluating the use of “or” in
between notice and advertisement. The use of “or” may indicate that
Congress intended notice and advertisement to have different meanings.247
The ordinary meaning of “or” is almost always used to give the words
separate meanings. The definition of advertisement clearly includes public
communication but the disjunctive nature of “or” creates an impression that
notice does not need to have a public component. If the courts had given
more weight to the use of “or” in the statute, they would have construed
advertisement to include public communication and notice to include
communication to smaller circles or private communication.
3.

Noscitur a Sociis

The canon of noscitur a sociis gives words grouped in a list related
meanings.248 The canon allows for words to have a more specific context by

239

Id.
See ESKRIDGE, supra note 211, at 85.
241
Id. at 87.
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Caniff I, 916 F.3d at 943 (Newsom, J., dissenting).
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Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1).
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Caniff I, 916 F.3d at 943 (Newsom, J., dissenting).
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Caniff II, 955 F.3d 1183, 1189 (11th Cir. 2020).
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Id.
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Id. at 1191; United States v. Sammons, No. 2:19-cr-107, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191600,
at *20 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 15, 2020) (“The statute communicates to the reader that a ‘notice’ is
different from an ‘advertisement’ by use of the disjunctive ‘or.’”).
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Caniff II, 955 F.3d at 1190 (citing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 196 (2012)).
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using neighboring words.249 The Supreme Court has held that a list of three
words is not long enough to employ the canon.250 Given this, applying the
canon to “make, print or publish” and “notice or advertisement” should not
act as a tie-breaker for determining the meaning of a word in 18
U.S.C. § 2251(d).251 Additionally, the terms sought to be interpreted by
noscitur a sociis “must be conjoined in such a way as to indicate that they have
some quality in common.”252
A court applying noscitur a sociis to 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) should examine
all words in the phrase “make, print or publish” together to determine a
related meaning.253 The Eleventh Circuit considered all words in the phrase
“make, print or publish” when it reexamined its Caniff decision in 2020.254
The application is similar to applying the whole act canon. Words that follow
“make, print or publish” should be given a public communication
connotation. To “print” means “[t]o publish a book, article, music or the
like.”255 To “publish” means “‘[t]o make public announcement of’ or ‘to make
known to people in general.’”256 If the meaning of these two words are also to
apply to “make,” then the definition would only include public
communication.
However, if the court followed the Supreme Court’s precedent by not
applying noscitur a sociis to fewer than three words, the fact that “print” or
“publish” deals with public communication is irrelevant. The court in Caniff
chose to use noscitur a sociis as a tie-breaker to determine which ordinary
meaning of notice to apply.257 Conversely, the other courts reasoned that the
use of noscitur a sociis was not necessary to establish the ordinary meaning

249

See ESKRIDGE, supra note 211, at 408.
United States v. Franklin, 785 F.3d 1365, 1369 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing Graham Cnty.
Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 559 U.S. 280, 288 (2010)).
251
Caniff II, 955 F.3d at 1191.
252
Id. at 1191 (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 196 (2012)). Congress’s use of “or” highlights that it did not
intend for “notice” and “advertisement” to have qualities in common. Sammons, 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 191600, at *20.
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See, e.g., Caniff II, 955 F.3d at 1189.
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Id. at 1190 (alteration in original) (quoting Print, WEBSTER’S SECOND NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1944)).
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of notice within the statute.258 Those courts used legislative intent and other
canons of statutory interpretation.
IV. PROPOSAL
When Congress added section (d) to 18 U.S.C. § 2251 in 1986, it could not
have fathomed the prevalent use of smartphones and instant communication
in society.259 At the statute’s drafting, Congress envisioned criminalizing new
technology like online bulletin boards.260 However, including private,
person-to-person communication, like text messages within 18
U.S.C. § 2251(d) aligns with Justice Scalia’s idea that statutory language
should “encompass[] broad language that comes to be applied to technology
unknown when the operative words t[ake] effect.”261 Congress drafted 18
U.S.C. § 2251(d) in 1986 when cell phones were not as we know them today.
Text messages were not sent until 1992.262 Therefore, Congress had no way
of knowing that cell phone communications needed to be written into the
statute. Nonetheless, that should not prevent courts from reading 18
U.S.C. § 2251(d) to include private text messages that occur between abusers
and their intended victims.
Sexual abusers are now able to, through the use of cell phones, isolate their
victims in a way that a wide-reaching online notice cannot. Sexual abusers
groom many of their victims as a means of gaining trust.263 Grooming is
covert and difficult to pinpoint and quantify.264 One study found that 74% of
victims knew their abusers, and 58% of those victims were abused by a family
member.265 Cell phones make this contact easier while maintaining the covert
nature of grooming. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children
found that approximately 90% of reported sexual exploitation of children
involved direct communication or attempted direct communication between

258
United States v. Franklin, 785 F.3d 1365, 1369 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing Graham Cnty.
Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 559 U.S. 280, 288 (2010)); Caniff II, 955
F.3d at 1191.
259
Caniff I, 916 F.3d 929, 936 (11th Cir. 2019).
260
See United States v. Franklin, 785 F.3d 1365, 1369–70 (10th Cir. 2015) (citing H.R.
REP. NO. 99-910, at 6 (1986)).
261
Caniff I, 916 F.3d at 934 (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING
LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 86–87 (2012)).
262
Daniel Dudley, The Evolution of Mobile Phones: 1973 to 2019, FLAUNT DIGIT. (Nov. 27,
2018), https://flauntdigital.com/blog/evolution-mobile-phones/.
263
ANNE-MARIE MCALINDEN, ‘GROOMING’ AND THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN:
INSTITUTIONAL, INTERNET, AND FAMILIAL DIMENSIONS 22 (2012).
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Id. at 32.
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Id. at 29.
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the abuser and the victim.266
By failing to include private, person-to-person text messages under the
definition of notice or advertisement, courts have created a loophole that
Congress could not have intended when writing an otherwise comprehensive
set of child pornography regulations.267 To keep in line with the original
intent of Congress to eliminate the child pornography market, Congress
must respond to court decisions that deviate from this purpose. For children
to be adequately protected, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) must be interpreted broadly
to include private, person-to-person text messages. Because the courts have
not adopted a broad interpretation, Congress must amend the statute to
define “notice” and “advertisement” to signal Congress’s intent to protect
children from offers to participate in the production of child pornography.
A.

Clarity is Crucial in Child Sexual Exploitation Statutes

Vague and ambiguous statutes create problems for all citizens. Vague
statutes are less likely to warn the public of what is prohibited by the
statutes.268 Vague statutes also “delegate enforcement and statutory
interpretation to individual government officials” or the courts.269 In
addition, vague statutes limit individual freedoms because citizens are often
fearful of violating the law when it is unclear what the law actually is.270 In
terms of the production of child pornography, notice or advertisement as
used in 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) does not provide adequate warning for the type
of communication that is prohibited.
Section 2251(d)’s use of the term “notice” is vague. As is evident through
the opinions in United States v. Caniff, the meaning of notice is not clearly
defined.271 The 2019 court found that the boundaries of notice included
private, person-to-person communications, but the 2020 court found it did
not.272 Congress has the power to review both federal and Supreme Court
decisions to acquiesce the decision of the court or change the legislation.273
Today, Congress does not respond as often to Supreme Court decisions as it
266

NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILD., supra note 50, at 4.
Caniff I, 916 F.3d at 936.
268
Ilya Shapiro, Vague Laws Defy the Rule of Law, CATO AT LIBERTY BLOG (Dec. 17, 2009,
10:07 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/vague-laws-defy-rulelaw#:~:text=Vague%20laws%20involve%20three%20basic,interpretation%20to%20individua
l%20government%20officials.
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See Caniff I, 916 F.3d at 936; Caniff II, 955 F.3d at 1192.
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Caniff I, 916 F.3d at 936; Caniff II, 955 F.3d at 1192.
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has in the past.274 When the courts previously interpreted parts of statutes
involving child pornography, to the extent that it interfered with their
intended purpose, Congress responded with amendments.275
Throughout the legislative history of child pornography statutes, Congress
responded to Supreme Court decisions that impacted the effectiveness of
federal statutes.276 After New York v. Ferber, Congress reevaluated the
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 and passed
the Child Protection Act of 1984.277 The Supreme Court again impacted the
effectiveness of a federal statute after 1984, which, coupled with the Court’s
decision in Osborne v. Ohio,278 led to the passage of the Child Protection and
Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990.279 Congress made a
habit of reexamining statutes weakened by Supreme Court decisions to the
point where Congress’s purpose for the acts were no longer fulfilled.
However, Congress has not followed this precedent of reexamination in
several years.
To ensure that the federal statute is being applied in various jurisdictions
in a similar manner, Congress must respond to the statutory precedent
created in various circuit courts. A federal statute should not be interpreted
one way in the Eleventh Circuit and another way in the Tenth Circuit. The
national and international nature of the child pornography industry
demands that the federal statute have a consistent definition. To achieve a
consistent definition, Congress must provide standardized definitions for
both notice and advertisement within 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d).
B.

Proposed Amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 2251

Congress can adopt a method of statutory interpretation that would allow
the courts to apply the ordinary meaning intended by Congress. When a
statute defines a word, an interpretation of the word should follow the
ordinary meaning of its statutory definition. 18 U.S.C. § 2256 is the
designated statute for definitions, which currently does not include
definitions for notice and advertisement.280 Congress must add both “notice”
and “advertisement” to the definitions section of the statute to ensure that
federal courts are interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) as intended. Failing to do
274
275
276
277
278
279
280

ESKRIDGE, supra note 211, at 162.
See Mazzone, supra note 81, at 174–197.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 185.
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 121–22 (1990).
Mazzone, supra note 81, at 191 & n.140.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2256.
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so creates a loophole for sexual abusers to prey on children privately and to
make new pornographic material without facing the stiff punishments
associated with the statute.
Federal courts agree that “advertisement” is a public, and usually, a
commercial statement. 281 The definition that should be adopted into § 2260
is:
A public notice or announcement, especially one promoting
a service. A notice is public if it is directed at society as a
whole or a smaller subset therein. Public notice or
announcement includes but is not limited to
communications initiated through public webpages, large
internet chatrooms, online message boards, and file sharing
sites.
This definition highlights that advertisement focuses on public
communications and that another term, one separated by a disjunctive or,
would mean something different. When crafting the definition, the drafters
must consider the statutory canon of exceptions and provisos. This canon
limits the general legislative language by carving out exceptions to the general
rule.282 Depending on how the statute is drafted, this can be either an
exception or a provision. Regardless of how the definition is drafted, the
exclusion should be read narrowly and should not be expanded unless it is
expressly stated. Looking to the definition in § 2260, “public” should be
further defined to clarify that public communication does not exclusively
mean the general public at large. The definition should be expanded to
include, as stated above, both society as a whole and a smaller subset of
society.
The definition of notice should be determined by Congress. Congress
should outline what is required to achieve the goal they originally set out to
achieve, eliminating the child pornography industry. Given the advances in
technology that now include text messaging, social networking sites, and
messaging applications that allow for encrypted messages, it would make
sense for the definition to cover what “advertisement” does not. Courts
interpreting the statute seem to agree that the public component of
advertisement is not necessary in the definition of “notice.” However, the
court in Caniff took it too far by saying notice is not necessarily public.
Certainly, “public” cannot be private, person-to-person text messaging.
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Similar to the courts’ efforts to determine the definition of notice,
Congress should start its drafting by using the ordinary definition. The courts
in Caniff and Gries found “notice,” through one of its many definitions, to be
a “notification or warning of something.”283 In this context, “warning” does
not make sense, but a “notification” would fit with the idea of private, personto-person text messages. When a text message, or any type of private
message, is sent, it notifies the receiver about what the sender intends to
communicate. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d), the sender’s intention is
notification that they want to receive some form of sexually explicit material,
that is, child pornography from the minor they sent the message to. This
communication is similar to the cases previewed above that discussed the use
of private bulletin boards and message boards, where they posted a targeted
notification to have child pornography sent to them.
Congress should write the definition of “notice” to be a notification “given
from one individual or entity to another.”284 If Congress chooses to make the
definition of notice slightly broader yet chooses to not give it the full public
component, Congress could further state that notice need not be
communicated to the public at large or a subset of the public. To clear up the
ambiguity surrounding the meaning of notice, Congress needs to craft a
definition that conveys exactly how broad or narrow the meaning of notice
should encompass. Therefore, the definition Congress should add to 18
U.S.C. § 2256, concerning notice is:
Notice means a notification given from an individual or
entity to another. The notification need not be given to the
society as a whole or even to a small subset of society, private
communication is sufficient. A notification can be given
through private, person-to-person messaging, password
protected message boards, close friends lists, and private
email.
Adding definitions to the statute while choosing to leave the wording of
the statute intact provides Congress with an effective way of ensuring the
statute will be interpreted consistently among federal courts. Because the
child pornography industry has become harder to contain and eliminate,
having consistent definitions of what violates 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) is crucial
to ensure that the statute serves its intended purpose. By providing
definitions that encompass both public and private communication, the
283
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statute will be able to keep up with advancements in technology. The cottage
industry of child pornography provides enough challenges to law
enforcement. Eliminating an entire classification of communication will
create additional challenges for law enforcement when targeting producers
and distributors of child pornography.
The dissent in Caniff argued that there were other sections of Title 18 that
criminalized private, person-to-person communication in an effort to receive
child pornography.285 However, the dissent argued 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (a),
which prohibits the persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of “any
minor to engage in . . . any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of
producing any visual depiction of such conduct,” should have been used
instead.286 This statute would not adequately solve the problem that statutory
definitions were not added for notice and advertisement. Section 2251(a)
focuses on soliciting a minor to produce child pornography, which does not
capture those looking to receive child pornography from another individual
who already possesses it. The Eleventh Circuit has created a dangerous
precedent because sexual predators are now able to freely text each other
privately without any consequences. This cannot be what Congress intended
when drafting 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d). Therefore, Congress must redraft 18
U.S.C. § 2251(d) because courts have judicially altered Congress’s intent.
V. CONCLUSION
Millions of children fall prey to sexual predators each year.287 The
unknown number of childhood sexual exploitation victims are plagued by a
record of their sexual abuse circulating on the internet forever.288 The rise of
the internet gave the child pornography industry the ability to create and
distribute child pornography across the globe.289 Without a statute to convict
these sexual predators, the number of children victimized will continue to
rise.
Congress has addressed the child pornography problem by passing
numerous statutes expanding the protections afforded to children. Of those
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federal statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) has increased the severity of violations
involving the production of child pornography to protect children from
offers to participate in child pornography. Congress previously kept an eye
on judicial decisions to ensure that the intent of the statute remained
unchanged. However, in recent years Congress failed to keep the same
attentive eye and allowed federal courts to interpret statutes aimed at
addressing child pornography without much regard for the true purpose of
the statute.
Few federal courts have evaluated whether an individual knowingly made
a notice to receive child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d). In one case,
the Eleventh Circuit reexamined one of its previous decisions and, in doing
so, undercut the legislative intent of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) in a way that no
other circuit court had done previously. The ambiguity surrounding the
meaning of notice or advertisement hinders the statute’s effectiveness in
eliminating the child pornography industry. Congress must amend the
statute to define notice or advertisement to signal Congress’s intention of
protecting children from offers to participate in child pornography.

